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Badie, Wright decisions underscore
importance of actual assent to arbitration
By Richard C. Reuben

S

trange as it may seem, the U.S. Supreme Court and the
California Supreme Court in the past year have actually
agreed on something, and something important at that: That
the relinquishment of legal rights through mandatory arbitration contract provisions must be knowing and voluntary.
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the question in the
context of the authority of a labor union to waive the rights of
individual union members to bring statutory claims in public
courts by including a provision in
the collective bargaining agreement
that required claims arising under
the agreement to be arbitrated rather
than heard in a court of law.' In a
decision by Justice Antonin Scalia,
the court unanimously agreed in
Wright v. Universal Maritime
Services Corp. that the waiver of statutory rights that an
represents must be at least "clear and
arbitration provision
2
unmistakable."
The high court's ruling came just weeks after the California
Supreme Court affirmed an appellate court decision refusing to
enforce a major bank's unilateral imposition of a mandatory
and binding arbitration requirement on most business and
personal checking and credit card accounts. The lower court
had found the provision unconscionable under traditional
California contract law, in Badie v.Bank ofAmnerica.1
Taken together, these and other similar rulings suggest a
new, and in my view proper, judicial reticence to enforce
boilerplate, or "cram down," arbitration provisions.4 This new,
more sober judicial mood may be seen as a settling of the
judicial pendulum on mandatory arbitration that has been
swinging for much of the last decade or so. Before the late
1980s, the general rule, carried over from medieval England to
Colonial America, was that predispute agreements to arbitrate
were not enforceable, essentially on the public policy ground
that they improperly "oust" courts of their jurisdiction to
decide cases arising under the law of the sovereign.
The pendulum of judicial attitudes swung to the other side
of the arc in the late 1980s, when the U.S. Supreme Court
formally overruled the "ouster doctrine," and in the early 1990s
appeared to extend the judicial embrace of arbitration to
include provisions compelling the mandatory arbitration of
statutory discrimination claims in contracts of adhesion. For a
time it seemed, the general rule was "anything goes."
Continued on pge 21.
Richard C. Reuben is a Senior Research Fellow at Harvard
Law School, and editor of Dispute Resolution Magazine. He can
be reached at rcreuben@law.harvard.edu
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Ruling is cause of uncertainty
in consumer arbitration
By Carroll E. Neesemann
Sn February, 1999, the Supreme Court of California
refused to review the Court of Appeal's decision in
Badie v Bank ofAmerica, 67 Cal. App. 4th 779 (1998),
passing up the chance to remove uncertainty created by
the decision below. The Court of Appeal had refused to
compel arbitration under an Alternative Dispute Resolution
("ADR") clause sent to customers by Bank of America,
with monthly account statements, to be added to existing
customer agreements. The decision
has created uncertainty in that: (1)
The appellate court looked at only
some of the claims asserted, and
affirmed for defendant on others,
making the scope of the decision
unclear. (2) The decision was
grounded on several factual aspects
of Bank of America's underlying agreements and forms of
notice, making it hard for other financial institutions to
decide whether their existing agreements could be used to
comply and what additional contract language might be
needed. (3) Although the decision was purportedly
grounded on general contract principles, it exhibited a
hostility toward arbitration that made it unclear if even
contractual provisions meeting all of the apparent requirements of the decision would be upheld in California.
The matter is further complicated by a new Delaware
statute (S.B. 57) governing banks and other financial
institutions chartered in Delaware.

Factual background
In 1992 Bank of America began to send "bill stuffers" to
its customers containing an ADR clause that stated in
pertinent part (Badie, 67 Cal. App. 4th at 785):
Dispute Resolution - If you or we request, any controversy with us will be decided either by arbitration or reference. Controversies involving one account, or two or more
accounts with at least one common owner, will be decided by
arbitration under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association. All other controversies
will be decided by a reference under California Code of Civil
Procedure Section 638 and related sections. A referee who is
an active attorney or retired judge will be appointed by the
Continued on page 19.
Carroll Neesemann is a partner of Morrison & Foerster
LLP in New York City. He is the chair of the Arbitration Committee of the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution. He can be
reached at cneesemann@mofo.com.
1999

Fall 1999

Reuben,
continued from page 18.
Cases like Badie and Wright suggest
the pendulum has finally begun to settle
at a more reasonable, principled and intuitive judicial position: That pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate will be upheld if
they are "clearly and unmistakably" the
result of actual assent by the parties.
But wait, you say. Such reasoning
would undue the law of standard form
contracts of adhesion. After all, the common law decided long ago that the needs
of a large and complex society include
the ability to permit private parties to standardize contracts for classes of transactions. And didn't the U.S. Supreme Court
also tell us that arbitration provisions are
not to be treated differently than other
contractual provisions, even by state legislatures?5 This was essentially the position argued by the banking industry in
Badie, a position that plainly has been
accepted by at least one federal circuit
court, 6 and is reiterated in these pages
by a distinguished attorney, Carroll
Neeseman.
While such assertions are unquestionably true, they paint only half the picture.
The U.S. Supreme Court began painting
the other half in the years after Gihner, as
it began to push the pendulum back toward the center. In a series of cases, the
U.S. high court repeatedly reaffirmed the
principle that agreements to arbitrate
must meet the threshold requirement of
contractual validity before they may be
enforced.7 In so doing, the court has particularly stressed that state courts may
well void mandatory arbitration clauses
on the grounds of unconscionability.'
Badie merely accepted that invitation.
In my view, state courts should simply follow the U.S. Supreme Court's clear
guidance, and reassert the primacy of their
state laws of contract generally by applying their traditional doctrines of contract
formation to contractual arbitration provisions. In the adhesion contract context
at issue in Badie case, I believe the rule of
law that should emerge would generally
hold that arbitration clauses slipped into
the boilerplate of standard form contracts
are presumptively unenforceable on unconscionability grounds, absent some
evidence of actual assent.
A famous California Supreme Court
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decision, Graham v.Scissor-Tail,9 provides a familiar framework for explaining
the analysis, although I do account for
some variation among the states. The case
arose from a dispute between rocker Leon
Russell and the legendary Bay area concert promoter Bill Graham. In setting up a
concert tour, the two used the American
Federation of Musicians' standard form
contract, which called for mandatory and
binding arbitration of disputes by a panel
composed of AF of M members.
In refusing to enforce the provision
on unconscionability grounds, the Graham court synthesized prior California
contract law into a two-part test. First, the
contract must be one of adhesion - that
is, one not subject to bargaining and offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Second, the enforcement of the provision
must not frustrate the "reasonable expectations of the weaker or 'adhering' party"
or be "unduly oppressive or 'unconscionable.'"

item to be purchased and the essential
terms of the transaction (such as price and
quantity), not that they are also making a
decision on how related disputes will be
handled. To the contrary, to the extent a
dispute arises under the contract, most
consumers would expect a day in court,
even if it is small claims court, if they so
choose.
If you believe in the rule of law, the
rights waived in arbitration are substantial, and often include specific and hardfought statutory rights granted to consumers through the legislative political
process. An agreement to arbitrate essentially waives those rights in favor of a
less formal, but more arbitrary forum.
There is nothing wrong with such a
waiver, in my view, as long as it is a knowing and voluntary decision that has been
made "clearly and unmistakably."
But, you say again, how can such
notions of individual assent possibly
square with the concept of a standard form

Assent to waive one's right to a public forum by
accepting an arbitration clause in a standard form
contract can be established through a check-off
provision, just like the refueling and insurance
options in car rental agreements.
Applying that standard, the Graham
court ruled the mandatory arbitration provision unenforceable because it frustrated
the reasonable expectations of the weaker
party to a hearing before a neutral tribunal. Remarkably, the court chose to issue
its ruling per curiam, as if to underscore
the ease, solemnity and importance of its
decision
The law has long recognized that
permitting the drafting party to draft nonnegotiable terms has the benefit of efficiency, but also runs the risk of abuse.
Unilateral mandatory arbitration provisions constitute just such an abuse. They
oppress weaker parties by unilaterally
stripping consumers of their right to the
accurate and public application of the law
to disputes that may arise. They also frustrate a consumer's reasonable expectations of the terms of the deal. Consumers
reasonably expect that when they decide
to purchase a consumer item - such as a
computer or house or medical services they are simply making a decision on the

contract?
Let me simply suggest that the waiver
qua arbitration clause may surely be valid
if it is negotiated at the time of the transaction, as is commonly done in other areas. When one rents a car today, for example, there is almost always a negotiation over insurance and refueling options,
consummated by either the addition of
coverage and refueling to the contract, or
the customer's initialing of the rejection
of those options. Arbitration provisions
waiving important legal rights can be subject to a similar check-off procedure. Why
should the waiver of one's legal rights require less proof of assent than the purchase of a tank of gas?
Mandatory arbitration provisions in
contracts of adhesion expose the difficult
tension between individual contractual
rights and collective contractual needs.
The question is where we draw the line.
The law of adhesion contracts has traditionally used the doctrine of unconscionability to draw that line, and cases like
Fall 1999
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Graham v Scissor-Tail more precisely instruct us to draw it at the reasonable expectations of the parties. By presumptively refusing to enforce cram-down arbitration provisions for consumer claims,
absent evidence of knowing and voluntary waiver, we will restore those reasonable expectations, and, in the words of
the case law, ensure minimum levels of
integrity to the arbitration of consumer
disputes.
Endnotes
1.Wright v.Universal Maritime Svcs. Corp.,
525 U.S. 70 (1998).
2. It should be noted that using this waiver
analysis allowed the court to duck, at least
explicitly, the question presented of
whether its landmark decision inGilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane, 500 U.S. 20
(1991), overtumed its venerable holding
that unions may not waive the statutory
rights of the rank and file in collective
bargaining agreements. Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S., 36 (1976).
That question, which has badly fractured
the lower court, remains open, and, for the
foreseeable future, unlikely to be resolved
by the court as currently constituted.
3. Badie v. Bank of America, 67
Cal.App.4th 779 (Nov. 3, 1998), rev. denied
(Feb. 1999).
4. See, e.g., Duffield v. Robertson
Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d. 1182 (1998);
Engalla v.Permanente Medical Group, Inc.
15 Cal.4th 951 (1997) (HMO may be subject
to civil liability for fraud based on public
assurances that mandatory arbitration
program is faster, less expensive than
public litigation). For courts moving inan
opposite direction, see, e.g., McWilliams v.
Losicon, Inc., 143 F3d 593 (10th Cir. 1998)
and Koveleski v. SBC Capital Markets, Inc.,
167 F3d 361 (7th Cir. 1999).
5. See Moses H.Cone Mem'l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr., Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
For a discussion and criticism, see
generally Jean R.Stemlight, Rethinking the
Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's
Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh
Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of
Powers, And Due Process Concerns, 72
TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997).
6. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147
(1997) (Easterbrook, J.) ("A competent
adults are bound by such documents, read
or unread.")
7. See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc.
v.Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995);
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995) Volt Information
Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468
(1989); Perry v.Thomas, 482 U.S. 483
(1987)

8. First Options of Chicago v.Kaplan, 514
US. 938 (1995).
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Relevance and admissibility of evidence
are also critical issues. Judges are used
to being in charge and making decisions
according to set rules and established
precedent. By contrast, mediators need
to be good listeners and to be open to a
broad range of possible solutions, with a
view to helping the parties to arrive at an
acceptable, custom-made settlement of
their case.
Of course there are different types
of mediation; evaluative mediation, focusing more closely on the rights of the parties, is closer to judging. But whatever

backward-looking focus of adjudication
or judicial settlement.
That brings me to a fourth and related point. Even if ajudge is not mediating a case that she will later try, and even
if that judge has had an adequate amount
of high-quality mediation training (at least
30 hours),2 there may be an appearance
of impropriety. Suppose a newspaper reports that a judge met separately with one
side as part of his attempt to settle the
case. Does this comport with the public
expectation of judges as neutral, disinterested decision makers? Or suppose a
judge expends considerable effort to mediate a complex case but in the end does
not succeed because he believes that one
of the parties is being unreasonable, and

It may be that the adjudication and mediation
tracks are so different that the functions should be
separated entirely, leaving judges to judge cases
and mediators to mediate them.
the appropriate role of evaluation in mediation - and there is much debate about
that question - good mediators should
begin by exploring the respective interests of the parties, with a view to "creating
value" (or enlarging the pie) before dividing the pie. Often issues that at first appear to be purely distributive turn out to
be good candidates for value creation.
And value creation requires training and
experience different from that which
judges usually have. The skills required
of judges and mediators are sufficiently
different that we cannot assume that even
first-rate judges will turn out to be firstrate mediators. Some judges, of course,
do turn out to be good mediators, but that
is surely not the norm.
But, it will be said, "don't many
judges engage in settlement activities all
the time?" Yes, but settlement is not the
same as mediation. Settlement work by
judges is usually evaluative, rights-based
and often coercive. That may be more
appropriate for purely distributive types
of cases, but it is not for more complex
cases involving continuing relationships,
where the forward-looking focus of mediation operates quite differently from the

Diapte

so asserts. Even if the judge won't try
this case, could this episode be seen by
the intractable party and his lawyer as
foreshadowing possible bias by the judge
against them in future cases?
Finally there's the problem of perceived leakage in a small clubby court.
Even if the case is unsuccessfully mediated by Judge A, the parties may find it
hard to believe that none of the information disclosed at the mediation will become known to Judge B who is to try the
case.
Maybe the two tracks - mediation
and adjudication - are so distinct that it
is not desirable to align them. Perhaps
courts should have publicly paid, welltrained, full-time mediators functioning
separately but alongside the judges, all
as part of a broad-range Comprehensive
Justice Center. That, in effect, is now the
common pattern with respect to appellate
mediation programs. Why not do the same
at the trial level?
Of course not all trial mediation
would be done by court mediators. There
would still be referral to private mediators,
as there is now. And perhaps the court
Continued on page 24.
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